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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE(S)/RULE(S)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1983), Section 35-1-67
(1983) and Section 35-1-99 (1981) are the determinative statutes in
this

case.

Rule

568-1-9

of

the

Industrial

administrative rules is also applicable.

Commission's

They are set forth in

full in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit A.

SUMMARY OF REPLY
The Petitioner presented credible, unrefuted evidence that he
sustained a compensable industrial injury in March, 1983, while in
the employ of Respondent, Beaver Creek Coal Co.

The Doctors who

examined and treated Mr. Denny found that he had sustained an
industrial injury and that it was responsible, at least in part,
for his resulting permanent, total disability status.
The Industrial Commission committed error in concluding that
Mr. Denny7s claim was barred because he had not filed a claim
within three years of the date of his accident. Mr. Denny was not
required to file a claim for compensation with the Industrial
Commission within three years of the accident because he had
returned to work - although with difficulty - and had not at that
point incurred any life-time disability.

A statute which would

allegedly require him to file for benefits within three years is a
unconstitutional statute of repose and violates the Open Courts
provision of the Utah Constitution.
In addition, the Industrial Commission committed error in not
referring this matter to a Medical Panel for consideration of the

1

medical causation issues as required by one of its own industrial
claim rules.
This

Court

should

summarily

reverse

the

Industrial

Commission's determination that Mr. Denny did not establish legal
or medical causation, and remand with instructions to enter an
award establishing that fact because of the uncontroverted opinions
contained in the file.

In the alternative, this matter should be

remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene
a Medical Panel to examine and report on the medical causation
issues.
REPLY ARGUMENT
I
PETITIONERS 1983 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
LEGALLY AND MEDICALLY THE CAUSE OF
PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY.

WAS
HIS

Respondents allege that Petitioner failed to meet his burden
of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that his disability
was caused by an industrial accident".

(Respondent's Brief at 13).

It must be stressed that Respondents did not call any witnesses to
refute the testimony of the Petitioner and his witnesses, did not
have Mr. Denny examined by their own Doctor, and even joined
Petitioner in requesting the Industrial Commission refer this
matter to a Medical Panel! (R. at 94).
Without

any

contrary

medical

evidence

of

their

own,

Respondents seek to sustain the Industrial Commission decision by
misconstruing Petitioner's medical records. This is nothing more
than a transparent attempt to misdirect this Court's attention from

2

the pure legal issues involved by creating the appearance of a
nonexistent factual dispute.
As stated in his original Brief, "Mr. Denny does not deny that
he has pre-existing back injuries." (Petitioner's Brief at 11).
However, as argued in that Brief, just because a person suffers a
pre-existing condition, he or she is not disqualified from claiming
and obtaining workers compensation benefits. "Compensation is not
dependent on the state of an employee's health or his freedom from
constitutional weakness or latent tendency." Denver v. Hansen, 650
P.2d 1319, 1321 (Colo. App. 1982).

The clear law of this state is

that "the aggravation or lighting up of a preexisting disease by an
industrial accident is compensable...."

Powers v. Industrial

Commission. 427 P.2d 740, 743 (Utah 1967).
Respondents further attempt to confuse the contribution of Mr.
Denny's alleged 1987 industrial accident.

The record is clear,

however, that there was no compensable industrial accident in 1987.
Mr. Denny has admitted that there was no industrial accident in
1987; the Administrative Law Judge made a specific finding that
there was no industrial accident in 1987, (R. at 64); and the
Industrial Commission so found (R. at 113). The references to a
1987 accident in Petitioner's medical records is, in fact, little
more than a misunderstanding and a typographical error.

Any

significant reference to that accident in the medical reports is an
error of reference which would have been eliminated upon review by
a Medical Panel.

2

A fair review of Dr. Kirkpatrick's medical reports reflect
that he clearly attributed Mr. Denny's symptoms and disability, at
least in part, to his 1983 industrial injury.

The following are

ignored by the Respondents and are illuminating:
(a).

In a March 11, 1987 report to Dr. Richard T. Jackson,

Dr. Kirkpatrick stated as follows:
The patient says he first developed neck problems about
12 years ago when a rock fell on his back in a coal mine.
He had intermittent neck pain that came and went, and
then 3 years ago he injured his neck again when he got
caught underneath a belt line. This caused a soreness in
his neck and arms. The pain would usually come and go
but then about 6 weeks ago it became more frequent and
then constant. (R. at 206),
(b) .

In a February 2, 1988, medical report Dr. Kirkpatrick

reports that Mr. Denny had "No permanent impairment prior to the
industrial accident."

(R. at 217),

(c) . In a January 30, 1989, medical report to Dr. Morgan, Dr.
Kirkpatrick

stated as follows:

"He also had a severe

injury

accident in about 1982 in which his whole spine was hyperflexed."
(R. at 147); and,
(d) .

In a follow up report to Dr. Morgan dated April 25,

1989, Dr. Kirkpatrick specifically stated: "His symptoms apparently
started back in 1982 when he was involved
accident".

in a severe mining

(R. at 144).

Despite the existence of prior back problems, Mr. Denny had no
impairment prior to his 1983 industrial accident.
makes

it

clear

that

industrial accident.

Mr.

Denny 7 s

problems

Dr. Kirkpatrick

started

with

the

Any reference to a 1987 accident is in error

and does not accurately reflect the true cause of Mr. Denny's

£

permanent and total disability status.
determining

that

Petitioner

had

a

Dr. Kirkpatrick, after
45%

permanent,

partial

impairment, stated that Mr. Denny's total disability "...is at
least partially related to his industrial accident". (R. at 149).
The Respondents failed to offer any conflicting medical evidence of
this fact whatsoever.
The Industrial Commission simply cannot arbitrarily discount
competent, uncontradicted evidence indicating that the industrial
injury was the cause of Petitioner's present permanent, total
disability.

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 709 P.2d

1168 (Utah 1985).
1984).

Frito-Lav, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah

Respondents, recognizing this error, joined with the

Petitioner on his Motion for Review to the Industrial Commission in
asking that this matter be referred to a Medical Panel.

Any

confusion over the contribution of a phantom 1987 accident would
have been removed through the referral to a Medical Panel.

This

error by the Industrial Commission is more completely addressed in
Point III below.
Respondents further alleged that Mr. Denny had not marshaled
the evidence in favor of the Commission's Findings.

Although

Respondents concede that the Findings of the Administrative
Law Judge were "incorrect and should be disregarded" (R. at 90),
they allege that "... it is the Commission's findings of fact which
are on review and the Commission's findings are adequate and
clearly meet the standards set out in the recent case of Adams v.
Board of Review.

821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991)".

5.

(Respondent's

Brief at 17-18). Unfortunately, the Commission did not really make
any findings of it's own and in fact stated "We believe that the
ALJ did make adequate findings in this case...." (R. at 108). The
Industrial Commission did not make any new Findings of Fact;
rather, the vast bulk of their Denial of Motion

for Review

addressed purely legal issues concerning the applicable statute of
limitations.
The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, to the extent
that it made any, are simply conclusionary statements without any
indication as to the Commission's view as to what in fact occurred.
The actual Findings of Fact portion of the Order in this matter are
grossly inadequate and do not meet recent legal requirements. Even
the Respondent Employer and Insurance Carrier joined in arguing
that the matter should be referred to a Medical Panel, but both the
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission refused.
Such summary conclusions do not constitute proper fact-finding. In
the recent case of Adams v. Board of Review, supra at 20, this
Court stated:
While the purported "Findings of Fact written by the
A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a
finding to truly constitute a "finding of fact," it must
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred....
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the
Commission accepted one version over another.
The
evidence shows several possible configurations and
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes,
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact

£

occurred.
Since we cannot even determine why the
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of
the possible subsidiary findings.
The findings are
therefore inadequate.
The Findings made by the Industrial Commission are deficient
in that they fail to address in detail the issue of medical
causation.

The absence of a Medical Panel report makes this

failure even more glaring.
Although none of the parties, including the Administrative Law
Judge, dispute that Mr. Denny is permanently and totally disabled,
the Industrial Commission did not specify the degree to which that
disability

was

caused

by

the

1983

industrial

injury.

The

Industrial Commission spends a great deal of time discussing minor
discrepancies in the medical records, but does not make concise
findings as to Mr. Denny's current medical condition and the causes
for it. This failure was undoubtedly compounded by the Industrial
Commission's unwarranted refusal to submit the matter to a Medical
Panel,

and that

failure manifests

itself here

in inadequate

Findings.
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

recently

informed

Commission that:
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission,
7

this

800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815
P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
Once again even the Respondent Employer and Insurance Carrier
agreed that "The Decision and Order are not truly supported by
adequate findings based on the entire record". (R. at 90) . Despite
that remarkable concession, the Industrial Commission continues to
maintain

that

"adequate".

the

Administrative

Law

Judge's

Findings

were

They do not truly enter their own new Findings, but

rather merely restated the old ones.
The Industrial Commission's purported Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law should at a minimum be vacated and this matter
remanded with instructions that a new Order be entered with
detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusions were reached.

Failure to do so, denies

Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in support of the
Findings and show that it is not substantial.

Grace Drilling Co.

v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 1989).
II
THE THREE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 351-99 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE OF REPOSE.
A.
THE THREE YEAR STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS FOR
PERMANENT TOTAL COMPENSATION.
The

Industrial

Commission

denied

Petitioner's

claim

for

benefits on the basis that he failed to file a claim within three
years of the date of his accident, as obstensably required by Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-99 (1981).

The primary error in that

position is that the statute does not apply in cases such as Mr.
8

Denny's. The Industrial Commission in its Order Denying Motion for
Review specifically stated, "There is, however, no bar to medical
expense claims under this statute, and the issue of permanent total
compensation remains open.11 (Emphasis added), (R. at 111). Mr.
Denny, did in fact, file an application for permanent, total
disability benefits (R. at 1, 11) and it is acknowledged by all of
the parties, including the Industrial Commission, that Mr. Denny is
permanently and totally disabled. (R. at 52-53, 144).
B. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED/ SECTION 35-1-99 AS APPLIED IN THIS
CASE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE OP REPOSE.
In relying on the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated,
Section

35-1-99

(1981),

Respondents

rest

entirely

upon

the

precedent of Avis v. Board of Review. 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah
App. 1992).
case.

Avis, however, is not applicable to the facts of this

In Avis the Petitioner sought benefits an astonishing

twenty-two years after the occurrence of his industrial accident.
This Court found as follows:
Petitioner knew of his injury on July 4, 1968. He
received medical treatment for his injury and was aware
of recurring back pain over a period of several years.
Therefore, even though petitioner did not seek a
disability rating or file a compensation claim until
twenty-two years after his accident, he knew of the
injury and could have filed for compensation within the
statutory period. Id. at 59.
Unlike the Petitioner in Avis who had sought immediate medical
treatment following his industrial accident, Mr. Denny returned to
work the next day, only feeling sore.

The onset of his symptoms

began six months later with pain down his left neck, shoulder and
arm. Even at that time he did not see a doctor, but merely endured
9

the pain and continued to work.

(R. at 105) .

It was not until

three years latter, in the winter of 1986, that his symptoms became
severe enough that Mr. Denny finally sought medical treatment and
was referred to Dr. Kirkpatrick. (R. at 204-205).
In this case, unlike Avis, the three year statute functions as
one of repose rather than limitation in that it fails to take
account of the cumulative and increasing nature of Petitionees
injuries

which

compensation.

ultimately

ripened

into

a

valid

claim

for

It is undisputed by the parties that following the

accident, Mr. Denny continued to work for 4 and one/half years. If
the holding of Avis is applied with what Professor Larson in his
treatise on Workers' Compensation calls "medieval literalism", Mr.
Denny's claim for compensation is now barred because it was not
filed before it had even matured.

This Court has declared such a

statute as being one of repose and unconstitutional.

See Wrolstad

v. Industrial Commission, 786 P2d 243 (Utah App. 1990), and Velarde
v. Industrial Commission, 831 P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1992).
In Wrolstad, supra at 245, this Court acknowledged that "a
person can't file an occupational disease claim for a disease he
does not know he has." Likewise, Mr. Denny here could not file his
claim for permanent, total disability within three years of the
date of the accident as provided by the statute, because he
continued to work and did not know that he would be unable to work
later.

It is precisely that fact which in Mr. Denny's case makes

the statute, in application, one of repose and not limitation.

10

Professor Larson, whose view's on workers compensation matters
have always been given great weight by this Court, notes the clear
problems and fundamental unfairness that such a statute of repose
creates:
The classic illustration is that of the apparently
trivial accident that matures into a disabling injury
after the claim period has expired. A workman is struck
in the eye by a metal chip, but both he and the company
doctors dismiss the accident as a petty one, and of
course no claim is made, since there is no present injury
or disability* Eighteen months later a cataract develops
as the direct result of the accident. If the statute
bars claims filed more than one year after the
'accident,' and if the court applies the statutory
language with medieval literalism, the workman can never
collect for the injury no matter how diligent he is: he
cannot claim during the year because no compensable
injury exists; he cannot claim after the year, because
the statute runs from the accident. 2B Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law, Section 78.42(a), page 15-262 (1989).
* * *

Limitations periods are of course constitutional in
general, but is such a period valid when it begins to run
before a claim exists and assumes to destroy it before it
is born? Is it not elementary that the running of the
period must be related to the time of acquisition of the
enforceable right, rather that of some event which may or
may not coincide with that acquisition?
Suppose a
statute were passed which said than, in the event of any
highway collision, suit must be commenced within two
years of the last presidential election. This is in no
way any sillier or more oppressive than a statute which
says that a man who gets a bit of grime in his eye in
1960 which causes only slight irritation must bring a
claim for blindness within one year of that time—
blindness that does not develop until 1962. 2B Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 78.42(e), page 15272.5 (1989).
Mr.

Denny

compensation

is

without

entitled
regard

to
to

Annotated, Section 35-1-99 (1981).

permanent,
the

total

provisions

of

disability
Utah

Code

It is only in the event that

his lifetime claim is not accepted, that the statute would apply to

11

a request for temporary total, temporary partial and/or permanent
partial benefits. Avis is, on its face, distinguishable from the
facts of this case.

To the extent it is applied to Mr. Denny's

injuries, Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-99 (1981) operates as
a statute of repose and should be declared unconstitutional in such
an application.
Ill
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL.

IN

NOT

A. RESPONDENTS ARE BARRED ON APPEAL FROM ARGUING AGAINST
REFERRAL TO A MEDICAL PANEL.
The Respondent Employer and its insurance carrier in their
Answer to Applicants Motion for Review, specifically stated that
"FURTHER, Defendant moves that the matter be referred to a Medical
Panel to resolve the extent of impairments attributable to valid
and existing industrial accidents".

(R. at 94).

Despite this

request to the Industrial Commission, Respondents now, for the
first time, allege that referral was not necessary.

Respondents

should not be able to have it both ways, and should be barred from
abandoning their prior positions by arguing now that the matter
should not be referred to a Medical Panel.

See, LeBaron &

Associates, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479 (Utah App. 1991) and
Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989).
B.
UTAH ADMINISTRATE CODE, RULE R568-1-9 REQUIRES
REFERRAL OF THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL.
Utah

Industrial

Commission

Rule

R568-1-9

governing

the

"Necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel" provides in
relevant part as follows:

Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission
adopts the following guidelines in determining the
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person,
(b)
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.... See Addendum, Exhibit A.
Respondents base their argument that referral is not required
on the grounds that there are "no conflicting reports in this
case."

(Respondent's Brief at 25).

There were no conflicting

medical reports in this case simply because the Respondents chose
not to present any.

They did, however, join in requesting that

this matter be referred to a Medical Panel.

The need for a Medical

Panel should not be avoided by the Respondent's decision or failure
not to conduct their own consultative medical examination.
The Rule mandatorily requires that a panel "will" be used when
"one or more significant medical issues may be involved".

Although

the Rule further provides that "Generally a significant medical
issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports", the Rule only
states

that

such

is

the

case

"generally"

and

not

that

such

conflicting reports are inherently necessary in order for there to
be "significant medical issues".
13

There can be no genuine dispute that this case involved
"significant medical issues". The question of the contribution of
the

1983

industrial

injury

to Mr, Denny's permanent, total

disability status is the primary issue in this case.
this

case, the

only medical

reports

available

Indeed, in

are

somewhat

ambiguous as to the exact causation and some additional confusion
was created by Dr. Kirkpatrick's referral to the nonexistent 1987
industrial accident, rather than the actual one in 1983. It is for
these reasons that referral to a Medical Panel was necessary and
the failure to do so was more than an abuse of discretion - it was
plain error.

See Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616

(Utah 1979) and Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693
(Utah 1980) interpreting the former Utah Code Annotated, Section
35-1-77 (1953) which made referrals to Medical Panels mandatory in
cases of denied liability.
C.

REFERRAL IN THIS CASE WAS NOT DISCRETIONARY.
Although the applicable statute makes referral to a

Medical

Panel

discretionary,

the

Industrial

Commission

Rule

exercises that discretion by making it mandatory in selected cases,
i.e., should any of the requirements in subsections (a), (b) or (c)
of the Rule be met. In response to this argument, Respondents make
three points:
1. Legislative Intent. Respondents argue that the Industrial
Commission cannot adopt a mandatory rule when the legislature
provided that referral would be discretionary.

It is clear that

given a grant of discretion, an administrative agency can adopt

rules and regulations governing the application of the discretion.
Indeed, the failure to do so itself may be an abuse of discretion.
Were this not so, the Industrial Commission would be constantly
subject to claims of "abuse of discretion" since it would have no
standards to guide it in its exercise of discretion.
There is no conflict between the legislature's grant of
discretionary authority to the Industrial Commission, and the
Industrial Commission's adoption of a rule that it will exercise
that discretion
circumstances.

by making referrals mandatory

under specific

Such rule-making is a proper utilization of the

Industrial Commission's discretionary authority granted by the
Statute.
2. Exceeding the Scope of Legislative Authority. Respondents
also argue that the Industrial Commission's Rule, providing for
mandatory referral in certain circumstances exceeds the scope of
the discretionary authority granted by statute.

They cite no

authority on point for this position. Respondents are essentially
remaking the same point addressed above. A regulation which makes
referral to a Medical Panel mandatory under certain circumstances
is consistent with the discretionary authority to make those
referrals granted by the statute.

The regulation is not void for

the mere reason that it specifies the terms and conditions under
which the grant of discretion will be exercised.
3. The Administrative Law Judge Can Disregard The Finding of
the Medical Panel.

Mr. Denny does not dispute the fact that the

Medical Panel report is not conclusive on the issue of medical
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causation. The Administrative Law Judge, and indeed the Industrial
Commission itself, may, after viewing the evidence as a whole,
including the report of the Medical Panel, make the decision that
other evidence in the case outweighs the findings and conclusions
of a Medical Panel.

Respondent's argument, however, does not at

all address whether a Medical Panel report should, in the first
instance, be received and considered.
The Respondent's argument that administrative agencies' rules
are mere "guidelines11 which can be disregarded at will has already
been considered and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.

In State,

bv and through Department of Community Affairs v. Utah Merit System
Council. 614 P.2d 1259, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
The Council cannot violate its own procedure rules....
Defendants contend that procedure rules are mere
'guidelines', but administrative regulations are presumed
to be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or
followed by the agency to suit its own purpose. Such is
the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. Without
compelling reasons for not following its own rules, an
agency must be held to them, (citations omitted) Id. at
1263.
That holding is well grounded and finds authority in virtually
all jurisdictions.

An administrative agency may not violate or

ignore its own rules, and where it fails to follow the rules which
it has promulgated, its orders are unlawful.

Clay v. Arizona

Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc., 779 P.2d 349 (Arizona 1989).

Tew v.

City of Topeka Police and Fire Civil Service Commission, 696 P.2d
1279 (Kansas 1985). State ex rel. Nevada Tax Commission v. Safeway
Super Service Stations, Inc., 668 P.2d 291 (Nevada 1983). U. S. v.
RCA Alaska Communications Inc., 597 P.2d 489 (Alaska 1979).
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Should there be any conflict between a statutory grant of
authority and an administrative rule, the rule controls where the
matter at issue is merely "procedural" as distinguished from being
"substantive." State v. Hawkins. 680 P.2d 522 (Arizona App. 1984).
Clearly, referral of a workers compensation case to a Medical Panel
is not a substantive matter but rather a procedural one.

As

Respondents have pointed out, the Medical Panel report is merely
additional evidence which must be weighed with the record as a
whole and may be disregarded by the ultimate fact finder, if a
proper basis exists to do so.

In such cases, the administrative

rule controls over the statutory enactment.
Although

reference

to

a Medical

Panel

under

Utah

Code

Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1982) is discretionary, that discretion
is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory by the Commissions
own Rules and Regulations.

The failure to refer a matter to a

Medical Panel, when such referral is requested by all parties and
is necessary to resolve medical causation issues, is plain error.
"In some cases, such as where the evidence of causal connection
between the work-related event and the injury is uncertain or
highly technical, failure to refer the case to a medical panel may
be an abuse of discretion."

Champion Home Builders v. Industrial

Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985).

See also Hone v. J.F.

Shea Co.. 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986).

In this case, the causal connection between the work-related
injury and the Petitionees permanent, total disability, if not
clear, was at least uncertain and failure to refer the matter to a
17

Medical Panel was error.

The Order Denying Motion for Review

should, at the least, be reversed and the matter remanded with
directions to refer the matter to a Medical Panel since failure to
do so was in direct conflict with Industrial Commission practice
and its own rule.

The failure to obtain a Medical Panel report

resulted in the Industrial Commission lacking the essential and
necessary information required to properly adjudicate Mr. Denny's
claim.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its August 10, 1992
Order dismissing Mr. Denny's claim for permanent, total disability
benefits for lack of legal and medical causation, as well as for
failure

to

meet

a

certain

statute

of

limitations.

The

uncontroverted evidence submitted to the Industrial Commission
supports the finding that he sustained a significant impairment due
to his 1983 industrial accident, and is permanently and totally
disabled - at least in part - as a result of that industrial
injury.

To the extent there is any doubt or confusion as to

medical causation, it was error for the Industrial Commission not
to convene a medical panel.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either
award Mr. Denny benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and
medical evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a
Medical Panel.
18

DATED this 26th day of February, A}*'*
(BNEY & DABNEY/l/p.c.

VIR05WIUS Di

1^.

Attorney for Petitioner
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EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. Box 510250
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(1 copy)
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A;

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988).
Utah Administrative Code Rule R568-1-9.

21

35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments. The commission
niay make a permanent partial disability award at any time prior to eight years
after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting from
such injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and
K'ho files an application for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year
period.
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends, or the
death of the injured person.
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66 % % of that
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a
maximum of 66 % % of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent
spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum
of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 66 %% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number
of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the
compensation provided for temporary total disability and temporary partial disability, to wit:
For the loss of:
Number of Weeks
lA) Upper extremity
(1) Arm
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation)
.218
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion
187
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below
elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon
178
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon
168
(2) Hand
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation
168
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints
101
(3) Thumb
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of carpometacarpal
bone
67
(b) At interphalangeal joint
50
(4) Index finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
42
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
34
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
18
For the loss of:
Number of Weekg
(5) Middle finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
3.
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
\] 27
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
l5
(6) Ring finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
1?
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
l3
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
~.
8
(7) Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
g
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
$
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
4
(B) Lower extremity
(1) Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis)
•
155
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium
;••; .>»•»..»....;....
125
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes
amputation or below knee with short stump (three inches or less
below intercondylar notch)
112
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump
88
(2) Foot
(a) Foot at ankle
88
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's)
66
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation
44
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(3) Toes
(a) Great toe
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
(iii) At interphalangeal joint
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th)
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
(b) Total blindness of one eye
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing
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12
4
3
2
1
26
120
100
100

(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of
the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete
loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the
items listed (B) (4).
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as follows:
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels
with frequencies of 500,1000xftfld20002 and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using pure
tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ASA 1951) (ANSI 1969) approved by
nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 2000 3000 cycles per second
shall not be considered in determining compensable disability. If the average decibel loss at 500^ 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second ]s 25 deciEelTor less, usually
no hearing impairment exists.
"Presbycusis" is defined as hearing loss common to persons of advanced age and
s considered to be due to general environment rather than industrial conditions.
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical profesaefts professionals appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear
it the three four frequencies 500, 10002ftftd2000£ and 3000 cycles per second which
shall be added together and divided by three four to determine the average decibel
oss. 5^ allow ler presbycusis, there shall be deducted from the average decibel
•ess -Vtftdecibel fer eaeh year ef the employee's age over forty at -the -feme of-the
accident: To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, (after deduction
rf the less m decibels ler presbycusis) the average decibel loss for each decibel
}f loss exceeding fifteen 25 decibels shall be multiplied by \xk% up to the maximum of 100% which is reached at 82 92 decibels.
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss
in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer
ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing
loss. Compensation for permanent partial disability for binaural hearing loss shall
be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks
of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter. Where an employee files one
or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found
to exist shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no
event shall compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss
exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits.
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise provided
for herein, such period of compensation as the commission' shall deem equitable
and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for specific loss as set forth
in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in any case 312 weeks, which shall
be considered the period of compensation for permanent total losp of bodily function.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the
maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall
more than a maximum of 66%% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be required to be paid.

35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Vocation*!
rehabilitation — Procedure and payments. In cases of permanent total disability
the employee shall receive 66 % % of his average weekly wages at the time of the
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the
age of eighteen 18 years, up to a maximum of four sueh dependent minor children
not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury
but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or
its insurance carrier be required to pay s«eh weekly compensation payments for
more than 312 weekst a«d provided further, that a. A finding by the commission
of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such
time as the following proceedings have been had: Where If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory
that the industrial commission of Utah refer sueh the employee to the division of
vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education for rehabilitation
training and it shall be the duty of the commission to order paid to stteh the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund provided for by occtie»
subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training
of st*eh the employee; the rehabilitation and training of stieh the employee shall
generally follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the division of
vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah a«4 in writing that mtb the employee has fully
co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be rehabilitated,
then the commission shall order that there be paid to sueh the employee weekly
benefits at the rate of 66 % % of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury,
but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus
$5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age
of eighteen 18 years, up to a maximum of four stieh dependent minor children not
to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but
lot to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the tfime of the injury per
veek out of the second injury fund provided for by section subsection 35-1-68 (1),
%
or such period of time beginning with the time that the paymentSj fas in this sec;ion provided)2 to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and
ending with the death of the employee. No employee; however, shall be entitled
:o any such benefits if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein under this section.
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to benefits
from the second injury fund designated m subsection (i) of section 85-1-68 under
subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive
not less than $±Q0 $110 per week when paid only by the second injury fund, or
when combined with compensation payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the
work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall,
after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether
she employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily
function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, or
both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shaW constitute constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions
of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability shaM be is
required in streh those instances; m. In all other cases; however, a«d where there
has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function,
the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections
35-1-65, 35 1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 312 weeks.

35-1-77. Medical panel — Discretionary authority of commission to refer
case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for death,
arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the employer or insurance
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the medical aspects of the case
to a medical panel appointed by the commission and having the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel set forth in section 35-2-56. The medical
panel shall then make such study, take such X-rays and perform such tests, including post-mortem examinations where authorized by the commission, as it may
determine and thereafter make a report in writing to the commission in a form
prescribed by the commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission may require. The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the
report of the panel to the applicant, the employer and the insurance carrier by
registered mail with return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report
is deposited in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer or the
insurance carrier may file with the commission objections in writing thereto. If
no objections are so filed within such period, the report shall be deemed admitted
in evidence and the commission may base its finding and decision on the report
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if there is other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the commission. If objections to such report are filed the commission may set the case for
hearing to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such hearing any party
so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the medical panel
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause
shown the commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the
chairman, to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination.
Upon such hearing the written report of the panel may be received as an exhibit
but shall not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained
by the testimony admitted. The expenses of such study and report by the medical
panel and of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the fund
provided for by section 35-1-68.

35-1-^9. Notice of injury and claim for compensation — Limitation of
action — Tolling period for filing claim. When an employee claiming to have
suffered an injury in the service of his employer fails to give notice to his employer
0f the time and place where the accident and injury occurred, and of the nature
of the same, within 48 hours, when possible, or fails to report for medical treatment
within said time, the compensation provided for herein shall be reduced 15%; provided, that knowledge of such injury obtained from any source on the part of such
employer, his managing agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the injured sufficient to afford an opportunity
to the employer to make an investigation into the facts and to provide medical
treatment shall be equivalent to such notice; and no defect or inaccuracy therein
shall subject the claimant to such reduction, if there was no intention to mislead
or prejudice the employer in making his defense, and the employer was not, in fact,
so misled or prejudiced thereby. If no notice of the accident and injury is given
to the employer within one year from the date of the accident, the right to compensation shall be wholly barred. If no claim for compensation is filed with the industrial commission within three years from the date of the accident or the date of
the last payment of compensation, the right to compensation shall be wholly
barred; provided, however, that the filing of a report or notice of accident or injury
with the industrial commission, the employer or its insurance carrier, together with
the payment of any compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment
by the employer or an insurance carrier, shall toll the period for filing such claim
until the employer or its carrier notifies the industrial commission and employee,
in writing, of its denial of liability or further liability, as the case may be, for
the industrial accident or injury, with instructions upon said notification of denial
to the employee to contact the industrial commission for further advice or assistance to preserve or protect the employee's rights; and provided further, that the
said claim for compensation in any event must be filed within 8 years from the
date of the accident.

R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel,
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a
case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b)
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90
days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting
to more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report.
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for
consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers7 Reinsurance
Fund.

